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DOES GENETIC ENGINEERING NEED GENETIC 
ENGINEERS?: SHOULD THE REGULATION OF 
GENETIC ENGINEERING INCLUDE A NEW 
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE? 
Stuart Auchincloss' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Genetic Engineering, especially the change of inherited character-
istics in living organisms by direct modification of the chemicals 
which transmit these characteristics, will soon be routine. Even 
though routine, these interventions in the processes of life will not 
thereby become fully understood nor free of unintended effects. 
Although genetic engineering is new, the phenomenon of un predicted 
benefits and problems from new technology is surely as old as the 
intentional use of fire by our earliest ancestors. 
This Article considers how genetic engineering and its products, 
are and should be regulated. For all introductions of new technology 
before now, from railroads to synthetic chemicals, the basic rule has 
been no regulation until there was a public outcry about the damage. 
For the first time, with biotechnology,l regulation of the technology 
is growing up with the new science itself; having begun almost as 
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1 In this Article, biotechnology is synonymous with genetic engineering. 
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soon as the early researchers perceived the potential dangers in 
their experiments. 
These new regulations, this Article argues, must feature both 
technical and political aspects similar to urban land use law. Just as 
urban development requires a technical building code to protect 
consumers and the general public, genetic engineering requires a 
detailed technical regulation of its activities, particularly releases 
into the environment. At the public policy level, just as land use 
planning through zoning laws balances public taste and aesthetics 
with the market, genetic engineering requires a "public planning" 
type process to balance public opinion with the commercial uses of 
the technology. 
The release of gentically modified organisms to the environment, 
however, differs from the introduction of other technologies. This 
new technology is burdened with the emerging sense among many 
people of nature's moral importance in addition to nature's aesthetic 
and utilitarian values.2 The commercial interests' accommodations in 
biotechnology to the many public interests may be quite different 
from the societal accommodations obtained in other regulated enter-
prises, such as large scale real estate development. 
Section II of this Article describes the new science of genetic 
engineering and some of its implications. In Section III, this Article 
provides a survey of some of the existing regulations governing 
releases of genetically modified organisms to the environment. A 
new regulatory scheme is proposed in Section IV featuring a licensed 
professional responsible for supervising all releases to the environ-
ment of genetically modified organisms. This licensed professional 
would have broad training in doing such releases safely and an ethical 
obligation to the public good. 
II. BIOTECHNOLOGY TODAY 
A. What is Biotechnology? 
Biotechnology is the new alchemy; the science which turns an 
ordinary bacterium into a factory for making human insulin. Genetic 
engineers use biotechnology to create genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs)-organisms deliberately modified by the direct introduction 
2 See Mark Sagoff, "What is Environmentalism?", a paper delivered to the AAAS Confer-
ence in Washington, DC, February 16, 1991, at Footnote 30 with extensive references to 
public opinion research on these matters. (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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or manipulation of genetic material in their genomes. 3 When a sci-
entist deliberately modifies an organism's genome through cross-
breeding, intentional mutation, or other technique, the resulting 
organism is referred to as a "deliberately modified organism" 
(DMO).4 
The breakthrough in molecular biology that allowed the field of 
genetic engineering to arise was the discovery that deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA), the complex chemical which carries the genetic blue-
print from one generation to another, is identical for every class of 
organism. 5 Because the genetic code is the same for bacteria and 
humans it is possible for scientists to insert into bacteria the frag-
ment of human genetic material which codes for the production of 
insulin. 6 The descendents of that bacterium will continue to carry 
this "human" trait. Insulin is then produced from these bacterium 
through a fermentation process. 7 
The terms "biotechnology" and "genetic engineering" refer to the 
study of genetic codes and the techniques necessary to transmit or 
modify genetic characteristics. Possible medical applications of this 
technology are very diverse. Besides allowing scientists to study the 
bodily processes of health and disease at the cellular and sub-cellular 
level, biotechnology has the potential for eliminating at conception 
certain genetic disorders that afflict human children. 8 The same tech-
nology theoretically could allow parents to preselect their children's 
sex, hair color, eye color, or any other inherited characteristic. 9 
Scientists also use biotechnology to create laboratory animals 
which mimic human physiology in order to make the animals more 
useful analogs for medical research.1O The insertion of a human ge-
3 This article uses "genome" in the tenn's popular sense to refer to the complex chemical, 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which carries the genetic code of an organism's fonn and 
function, that is; the sum total of the organism's genes. 
4 See 55 Fed. Reg. 31118. 
5 For example, a gene that produces a protein in a human cell can be isolated and inserted 
into a bacteria. STEVE OLSEN, BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE 15 (1986); see 
also JAMES D. WATSON & JOHN TOOZE, THE DNA STORY, 3 (1981). 
6 See id. 
7 See generally OLSON, supra note 6 at 4, 22-24 (describing the fennentation process). 
8 See SHELDON KRIMSKY, BIOTECHNICS AND SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL GENETICS 
172-73 (1991). 
9 Id.; see also Malcolm Gladwell, Gene-Defect Tests Planned, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1990, 
page AI. 
10 William Booth, Mice Altered to Develop a HurlULn Leukemia, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 
1990, page A4; William Booth, Scientists Advance Gene Implant Technique in Mice, WASH. 
POST, April 19, 1990, page A22; R. Weiss, Drug Resistance Gene Saves Mouse Marrow, 137 
SCIENCE NEWS 293, 293, May 12, 1990. 
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netic code into that of other organisms raises an important philo-
sophical question: does it make any difference that a particular lab-
oratory animal has human genetic material, or that animals 
slaughtered for meat have a human growth hormone? From a tech-
nical point of view, a bacterium does not become a human being just 
because the organism carries the human-derived genetic information 
for making insulin, but the question raises issues that scientific 
research alone cannot answer. 11 
Scientists can also use biotechnology to make plants which are 
more resistant to drought or various diseases. 12 Biotechnology has 
the potential for augmenting the nutritional value of plants-for 
example, fortifying corn with amino acids. 13 Biotechnology's first 
agricultural use, however, is making plants more resistant to chem-
ical herbicides, thereby allowing heavier applications of toxic chem-
icals which often become environmental problems themselves. 14 
In addition to potential benefits, genetic engineering may also 
produce serious problems. 15 Although most biotechnology research 
to date has taken place in enclosed laboratories, experiments which 
include releasing genetically modified organisms into nature raise 
difficult questions. What happens to the genetically modified organ-
isms in the environment? Does the organism have a competitive 
advantage over natural organisms or will the genetically engineered 
organism run wild, filling an empty biological niche? Do the engi-
neered genes in the organism transfer to wild relatives giving the 
wild organisms undesirable properties? 
B. The Living Environment 
Perhaps it is misleading to talk about "the environment" as if 
there were only one. Consider the question of scale. For a human 
observer it is easy to see that "the environment" changes within a 
few feet; here is a maple tree, a few feet away is a patch of grass, 
11 In 1988, the United Kingdom Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation produced 
detailed guidelines on the use of transgenic animals. Peter Newmark, Guidelines Produced 
for the Use of Transgenic Animals in Research, 337 NATURE 295, Jan. 26, 1989. The chair 
of the working party that drew up the guidelines said that it is inconceivable that approval 
would be given for the consumption of animals containing a human transgene. [d. 
12 Margaret Mellon, "Biotechnology and the Environment," National Biotechnology Policy 
Center, National Wildlife Federation, 1988, pages 24-25 (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). 
13 [d. 
14 KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 219 (1991). 
16 See infra § II.B. 
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a few feet beyond that an oak tree, a few feet beyond that a stretch 
of pavement and so on. The change is even more rapid at the micro-
scopic level, where typical agricultural soil contains ten to one 
hundred million bacteria per cubic centimeter. 16 
Despite this great diversity, the science of ecology has made cer-
tain observations about the environment that are relevant to the 
regulation of releases of genetically modified organisms to the en-
vironment. Barry Commoner has written a vivid description of some 
of these relationships.17 
Commoner's first basic law of ecology is "everything is connected 
to everything else. "18 Hence, any regulation of the release of genet-
ically modified organisms to the environment must take into account 
the effect on the entire receiving ecosystem. 
Another basic law of ecology is "everything has to go some-
where."19 Thus, in a closed ecosystem, organisms extract substances 
from the environment and use them, discarding portions in the form 
of waste which other organisms take up and use. 20 Because genetic 
engineering involves living organisms, which given the right circum-
stances, do not dissipate but multiply in the environment, the inter-
relatedness of all life is particularly important. 
Commoner's third basic law of ecology is "nature knows best"-a 
provocative way of describing nature's tendency to move toward 
stability.21 Just as "unnatural" organic compounds like dichlorodi-
phenyltrichloroethane (DDT) or dioxin have proven to be environ-
mentally difficult to degrade, so genetically "unnatural" organisms 
may lead to similar problems. 22 
Commoner's fourth rule of ecology is "there is no such thing as a 
free lunch."23 In other words, any change in an ecological cycle, or 
intrusion by an incompatible component, inevitably leads to harmful 
effects.24 What this means is that every action having an impact on 
an ecosystem has consequences which are inevitable and governed 
by the laws of nature. To the extent that these laws of nature are 
16 COMMI'ITEE ON THE INTRODUCTION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS INTO THE 
ENVIRONMENT, INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBINANT DNA-ENGINEERED ORGANISMS INTO THE 
ENVIRONMENT: KEy ISSUES, 17 (1987). [hereinafter "KEy ISSUES"]. 
17 BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET, 6-7 (1990). 
18 [d. at 8. 
19 [d. at 9-10. 
20 See id. 
21 [d. at 11-12. 
22 [d. 
23 [d. at 14. 
24 [d. 
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known, the consequences of an intrusion are predictable and unde-
sirable outcomes are preventable.25 To the extent that the laws of 
nature are not known, the consequences of an intrusion will come as 
a surprise. 26 
1. The Gypsy Moth Infestations 
The danger of releasing genetically modified organisms is similar 
to the danger of introducing organisms from other parts of the world 
into new locations where the transplanted organisms do not have 
natural enemies. 27 The gypsy moth in the United States is a partic-
ularly vivid example of this class of threat because the infestation 
began from a small initial release. The origin of this pest is a model 
of how an experiment in genetic engineering, which does not ade-
quately account for environmental problems, can go wrong. 28 
In 1868 Leopold Trouvelot came to Medford, Massachusetts from 
France, as a visiting professor at Tufts University.29 Trouvelot 
brought with him silk moths and gypsy moth larvae. Trouvelot's 
plan was to cross-breed these insects to create a hardy strain of silk 
moths for the French silk industry. 
The gypsy moths Trouvelot brought to the United States were 
natives to Europe and North Africa, where, controlled by predators 
and disease, the insects seldom caused noticeable harm to the native 
plants. In the eastern United States, however, with ample food and 
no natural enemies, the gypsy moth prospered. In 1889, twenty 
years after Trouvelot's moths escaped, Medford experienced the first 
gypsy moth infestation in the United States. In the last hundred 
years the gypsy moth has survived the intentional introduction of a 
number of its natural enemies into the United States, the aerial 
application of DDT from C-47 transports, and the best eradication 
measures that modern pest control science has to offer. 
2. The Southern Corn Leaf Blight 
While it is true that genetic engineering did not create the gypsy 
moth, biotechnology has produced problems pointing to limitations 
of the science. The major failure of the United States corn crop in 
26 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See KEy ISSUES, supra note 16 at 10-11. 
28 See id. at 10-11. 
29 This account is freely adapted from Learning to Live with Gypsy Moths, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 1981, § 6 (magazine), at 36. 
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1972 resulted from almost universal use of hydrid seed and a lack of 
complete ecological understanding. 30 
In creating hybrid corn seed,31 the American corn industry pro-
duced corn that was extremely susceptible to a particular race of a 
pathogenic fungus.32 Because this fungus seldom appeared on corn 
in the United States, corn breeders did not think resistance to the 
fungus was an important trait to select for in breeding seed corn. 33 
In 1970 this fungus, under the name of Southern Corn Leaf Blight, 
wiped out about fifteen percent of the United States corn crop.34 The 
blight caused a loss of about twenty million metric tons of corn worth 
about one billion dollars to the affected farmers. 35 
The far-reaching tragedies resulting from Trouvelot's gypsy moth 
experiments and hybrid corn seed demonstrate the problems that 
can occur when biotechnology collides with Commoner's laws of 
ecology.36 The Ecological Society of America has considered the 
ecological issues raised by the release to the environment of genet-
ically modified organisms and has made some suggestions for regu-
lating releases.37 The ecologist's suggestions provide a different per-
spective on the release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms than the suggestions of the scientists who plan and create 
the genetically modified organisms.38 Both scientific perspectives, 
however, are important in the regulation of biotechnology. 
c. The Future/or Farming 
Agriculture is one of the first industries biotechnology will revo-
lutionize. 39 The power to insert specific traits into the hereditary 
material of crop plants will accelerate greatly the trial and error 
method of selective breeding. 40 
30 See CALESTOUS JUMA, THE GENE HUNTERS, 101 (1989). 
31 Hybrid com seed, produced by cross-pollinating two inbred lines, produces com with a 
better yield than either of the parent strains. 
32 Helminthosporium maydis, race T. JUMA supra note 30, at 1Ol. 
33 See id. at 102. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text. 
37 See James M. Tiedje, et al., The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organ-
isms: Ecological Considerations and Recommendations, 70(2) ECOLOGY 298, 298-312 (1989). 
38 See id. 
39 See generally, KRIMSKY, supra note 8. 
40 See COMMITTEE ON ScIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED MICROORGANISMS AND PLANTS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT, BOARD ON BIOLOGY, 
COMMISSION OF LIFE ScIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETI-
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Scientists are using biotechnology to create agricultural crops that 
are resistant to herbicides, thus allowing an increase in the market 
for agricultural chemicals. 41 Many of the chemical companies that 
manufacture herbicides and the other components of chemical agri-
culture now own the major agricultural seed companies and are in 
control of their research efforts.42 Some see this development as a 
betrayal of the promise of biotechnology for agriculture. 43 
The big change in agriculture which genetic engineering will bring 
about, probably within the working lives of some scientists already 
in the field, will be the separation of agriculture from land. Presently 
there is not any theoretical scientific reason preventing genetically 
modified microorganisms from producing highly processed agricul-
tural products-such as flour, cocoa powder, or even hamburger-
in fermentation tanks as microorganisms produce beer and wine 
today.44 These genetically modified organisms, operating on inputs 
as simple as sunlight, water, biomass, and trace minerals, should be 
able to produce the economically desirable portions of plants and 
animals without concern for "natural" problems like frost, drought, 
insects, or governmental changes in remote countries. 45 A major 
investor in this technology is the Hershey chocolate company.46 Even 
though producing goods in a "brewery" makes commercial sense for 
a chocolate producer like the Hershey company, this technology 
spells economic disaster for farmers who produce and for national 
economies which are based on the production of cocoa. 47 
D. A Case Study, Bovine Growth Hormone 
Of further interest to agriculture is genetic engineering involving 
animals. For example, scientists can insert the human gene which 
codes for growth hormone into mouse cells in such a way that the 
CALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS, 30~1 (1989) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author) [hereinafter "FIELD TESTING GMOs"j. 
41 JUMA, supra note 30, at 113. 
42 See generally, Rebecca Goldburg, et al., "Biotechnology's Bitter Harvest, Herbicide 
Tolerant Crops and the Threat to Sustainable Agriculture" (1990) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author). 
4ll [d. 
44 See, Mark Sagoff, Biotechnology and the Environment: Ethical and Cultural Consider-
ations, 19 ELR 10520, 10523, n.23 (1989). 
46 See g.enerally JUMA, supra note 30, at 136-40 (discussing problems besetting cocoa 
farming and biotechnology's solutions). 
46 JUMA, supra note 30, at 139-40. 
47 [d. at 139-40. 
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mouse offspring inherit the gene.48 Are there any ethical implications 
in such experiments with the transfer of "human" characteristics 
into animals? 
Scientists have also isolated the gene for creating bovine growth 
hormone (BGH), which increases milk production when injected into 
COWS. 49 To date, scientists have not determined how to increase cows' 
natural production of BGH, so scientists produce the hormone from 
genetically engineered bacteria in a pharmaceutical laboratory. 50 
The production of BGH is a prime example of how the confusion 
between technical regulation and policy considerations has prevented 
regulatory actions on a product of biotechnology. In the last ten 
years pharmaceutical companies have genetically engineered bacte-
ria to produce quantities of BGH sufficient for use in commercial 
dairies. 51 When injected into productive cows, BGH has increased 
milk production by ten to forty percent. 52 Technicians at the United 
States Food and Drug Administration Center for Veterinary Medi-
cine (DVM) found there were no adverse effects on human health 
from consuming milk and meat from cows injected with BGH.53 
Despite the conclusions of the DVM reviewers, the Food and Drug 
Agency (FDA) delayed commercial marketing of BGH and requested 
a second opinion from the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH).54 After hearing three days of testimony from BGH re-
searchers and opponents of the drug, NIH concluded that the overall 
composition and nutritional quality of milk and meat from BGH 
treated cows is equal to the composition and nutritional quality of 
milk and meat from untreated cows. 55 
Simultaneously with this technical discussion, there was also a 
policy debate. Small dairy farmers were concerned that they could 
not manage the detailed recordkeeping necessary to use BGH, and 
that the price the small dairy farmers received for their milk would 
48 William Booth, Scientists Advance Gene-Implant Technique in Mice, WASH. POST, Apr. 
19, 1990, at A22. 
49 Judith C. Juskevich and C. Greg Guyer, Bovine Growth Hormone: Human Food Safety 
Evaluation, 249 SCIENCE, 875, 875 (1990). 
fJ) Id. 
SlId. 
62 W. Stoizenburg, Hormone-Boosted Milk Passes FDA Review, 138 SCIENCE NEWS 116, 
116 (1990). 
63 The technical basis for this conclusion is spelled out at some length in Juskevich & Guyer, 
supra note 49; see also R.N. Langreth, Milk from Engineered Hormone: Udderly Safe, 138 
SCIENCE NEWS 372, 372 (1990). 
54 Guy Gugliotta, A Wonder Drug or A Threat?, WASH. POST, June 24, 1990, at A3. 
55 Langreth, supra note 52, at 372. 
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be lowered as BGH enabled the larger, more industrial dairy farmers 
to lower their production costs. 56 In addition, consumer advocacy 
groups opposed BGH based on skepticism of the human and bovine 
health data provided by the four chemical companies that manufac-
ture BGH.57 
Adding to the political nature of this discussion, a nationally syn-
dicated newspaper column criticized the BGH approval process, al-
leging that the FDA fired one animal safety expert because he had 
not approved BG H earlier. 58 The newspaper also reported studies 
indicating that BGH could harm cows and affect the quality of milk. 59 
This brief history demonstrates that the BGH approval process 
was based only partly on the technology under consideration. The 
small dairy farmers who opposed the product may not have doubted 
BGH's efficacy, or even its safety, but were daunted by the man-
agement burden required to use the product. 60 From the newspaper 
accounts, it is impossible to tell whether the consumer advocate 
groups objected to BGH because of its danger, or the procedures 
the FDA used in the approval process, or the precedent those pro-
cedures set for future approvals of genetic engineering products. 61 
Splitting the approval process, as proposed in this paper, into tech-
nical and political components would allow each debate to remain 
focused on its own cluster of issues and thus improve both aspects 
of regulation. 62 
A systematic poll conducted in 1986 by the Congressional Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) indicated that although Americans 
favor the end products of biotechnology, they believe strict regula-
tion is necessary.63 The study also found that in disputes over risk 
statements, the public is inclined to believe environmental groups 
rather than government agencies.64 The strong implication here is 
that the public is ready for a comprehensive law regulating biotech-
56 Gugliotta, supra note 54, at A3. 
57 [d. 
58 Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, Bovine Hormone Treated as Sacred Cow, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 27, 1990, at C12. 
59 [d. 
60 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
6! See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
62 Such a law has been proposed in the European community, which is currently considering 
adding "socio-economic effects" to the list of criteria for approval of new medicines. Jeremy 
Cherfas, Europe: Bovine Growth Hormone in a Political Maze, 249 SCIENCE 852,852 (1990). 
63 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA), U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGy-BACKGROUND PAPER: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 5 (May, 
1987) [hereinafter "OTA SURVEY"]. 
64 [d. 
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nology, replacing the present regulatory patch-work and incorporat-
ing a cadre of professionals in whom the public may feel some con-
fidence. 65 
III. THE CURRENT REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
A. The Historical Roots 
When scientists in the early 1970s realized the power of biotech-
nology, they agreed on collective self-restraint in conducting exper-
iments which might be hazardous. 66 When the scientists' concern 
became public, the safety of their work became a political issue. This 
Section describes those early actions and the political debate that 
took place as a result, showing that with the exception of the par-
ticipation of a few non-governmental organizations, the scientists 
themselves have created all the federal regulation of biotechnology 
primarily on the basis of technical considerations, with only grudging 
acknowledgement of the existence of social issues. 
1. The 1973 Gordon Research Conference 
In 1973, Maxine Singer, a biochemist with NIH, was one of the 
two co-chairs of the Gordon Research Conference on Nucleic Acids, 
a meeting of professional molecular biologists. 67 On the last day of 
the conference, after the announcement of the powerful new tech-
nology of using restriction enzymes to combine the DNA of unrelated 
organisms, there was an unscheduled debate on the question of the 
potential hazards from dangerous synthetic mutant germs made pos-
sible by this process. 68 A large majority of those scientists who 
participated in this discussion favored expressing their concern to 
the National Academy of Sciences.69 Just a little over half of these 
scientists also favored making their concerns known more widely in 
the scientific community. 70 
Acting on this vote, Maxine Singer and her co-chair wrote to the 
president of the National Academy of Science and to the president 
of the National Institute of Medicine.71 The letter announced the 
65 See supra § IV. 
66 See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
67 WATSON & TOOZE supra note 5, at 6. 
68 [d. at 3. 
69 [d. 
70 [d. 
71 181 SCIENCE 1114, 1114 (1973). 
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scientists' concern that certain hybrid molecules may be hazardous 
to laboratory workers and the public. 72 The letter requested the 
National Academy of Sciences to establish a committee to consider 
the problem and recommend specific actions or guidelines. 73 As a 
result of the letter, the National Academy of Sciences established a 
committee of scientists to consider the matter in the Fall of 1973. 
A year later, on July 26, 1974 Science published an open letter 
from the National Academy of Sciences Committee to all scientists 
throughout the world suggesting a voluntary moratorium on certain 
genetic engineering experiments because the experiments were too 
risky for currently available laboratory containment technology. 74 
Although the concerned scientists intended only to encourage vol-
untary self-restraint among molecular biologists, the scientists' let-
ter began to alert journalists and the general public to the potential 
dangers of genetic engineering. 75 Six months after the publication of 
the letter, an international conference of molecular biologists con-
vened at Asilomar, California on February 24-27, 1975 to consider 
what the scientists themselves should do next. 76 
2. The 1975 Asilomar Conference 
Maxine Singer and four other concerned scientists organized the 
pivotal Asilomar Conference of molecular biologists in February 1975 
to discuss the future of biotechnology.77 The organizers proclaimed 
the following two principles to guide genetic engineering experi-
ments: containment as an essential consideration in the design of 
experiments, and the containment's effectiveness equaling the ex-
periment's estimated risk. 78 Even bearing these principles in mind, 
the conferees agreed that there were certain experiments which 
ought not to be conducted with the then available containment fa-
cilities. 79 
Beginning at Asilomar, eminent molecular biologists disagreed 
among themselves about the risk of the genetic engineering exper-
72 [d. at 6. 
73 [d. at 6. 
74 Paul Berg et al., Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 SCIENCE 
303, 303 (1974). 
75 See, e.g., WATSON & TOOZE, supra note 5, at 12. 
76 [d. at 25-27. 
77 [d. 
78 Paul Berg et al., Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188 SCIENCE 
991, 992 (1975). 
79 [d. at 991. 
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iments. 8o While most molecular biologists believed that raising the 
issues and warning each other was enough, a few molecular biologists 
felt that the experiments should be halted altogether. 81 
B. The Beginning of Federal Regulation 
1. The NIH Guidelines 
On October 7, 1974, four months before the Asilomar conference, 
the NIH's director already had formed the Recombinant DNA Mol-
ecule Program Advisory Committee (RAC) to consider three aspects 
of the new genetic engineering technology: potential hazards, the 
spread of genetically modified organisms in the environment, and 
guidelines for scientists working with such organisms.82 After the 
Asilomar conference, however, RAC focused almost exclusively on 
its third task, preparing guidelines for researchers. 83 
On June 23, 1976, the Director of the NIH formally issued the 
guidelines which effectively halted experiments using DNA from 
warm blooded animals and viruses. 84 NIH, the main source of federal 
funds for biotechnology research, required an institutional biosafety 
committee to review proposed experiments before the applicant 
could receive his or her grant to perform certain experiments. 85 The 
regulations also specified the degree of containment necessary for 
certain particularly dangerous genetic engineering experiments. 86 
Despite their strict limitations on biotechnology experiments, the 
guidelines appear to apply only to entities receiving research grants 
from NIH.87 In addition, the only sanction the guidelines imposed 
was cutting off funding for institutions that did not follow the guide-
lines. 88 
As scientists around the world have carried out safely many lab-
oratory experiments with genetic engineering, RAC steadily relaxed 
the guidelines until now most experiments require no more than 
80 See generally, Michael Rogers, The Pandora's Box Congress, 189 ROLLING STONE 36 
(1975) (reprinted in WATSON & TOOZE, supra note 5 at 28). 
81 See id. at 44. 
82 See 41 Fed. Reg. 27903 (1976); Collin Norman, Genetic Manipulation: Guidelines Issued, 
262 NATURE 2, July 1, 1976. 
83 Id. 
84 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902-43 (1979); Norman, supra note 82, at 2. 
85 41 Fed. Reg. 27,920-21 (1976); WATSON & TOOZE, supra note 5, at 63. 
86 See 41 Fed. Reg. 27,912-14 (1976). 
87 See generally 41 Fed. Reg. 27,920 (1976). 
86 Id. 
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local peer review.89 Thus, early in the regulation of biotechnology, 
the NIH guidelines established the pattern of making compliance 
voluntary for laboratories operating without government funds, 
most notably industrial and commercial laboratories. 90 
2. Congressional Study and Inaction 
Two months after the Asilomar conference, on April 22, 1975, 
Senator Edward Kennedy, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Health, held a hearing on the relationship of a free society to its 
scientific community.91 The hearing used genetic engineering as a 
case study to consider the public's role in both the direction of 
scientific research and the application of the research's results. 92 
The April 22 hearing was followed by another hearing on Septem-
ber 22, 1976 on the same subject. 93 In his opening remarks, Senator 
Kennedy drew particular attention to the problem of industry's "vol-
untary" compliance with the NIH guidelines.94 Senator Kennedy 
singled out General Electric for its unwillingness to participate in 
the hearing as an example of industry's unwillingness to follow the 
NIH guidelines. 95 
Following these hearings, efforts to adopt a biotechnology control 
act continued in both the United States Senate and the House of 
Representatives until March 1978 when legislative action ceased. 96 
Academic scientists oppossed biotechnology regulation by taking the 
extreme position that the proposed government regulation was sim-
ilar to the subjugation of Russian biological science to communist 
ideology during the middle of the Twentieth Century. 97 
Congressional interest in a biotechnology bill disappeared in the 
Fall of 1978 for many reasons including a lack of support from the 
executive branch, NIH's relaxation of its guidelines thereby imply-
ing that the threat of biotechnology was less than feared, and the 
89 See, NIH Section of the Coordinated Framework, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,349 (1990). 
90 See id. 
91 WATSON & TOOZE, supra note 5, at 63. The subcommittee on Health is part of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 
'iI2 [d. 
93 [d. at 144. 
94 See id. at 145. 
95 Opening Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy at a Hearing of the Senate Health 
Subcommittee on Recombinant DNA Research and the NIH Guidelines, Wednesday, Sept. 
22, 1976, (reproduced in WATSON & TOOZE, supra note 5, at 144-45). 
96 For a summary of the legislative action see 43 Fed. Reg. 33,046-47 (1978). 
97 See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, Gene Splicing: Senate Bill Draws Charges of Lysenkoism, 197 
SCIENCE 348, 348 (1977). 
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complexities of congressional politics. 98 At the same time, Secretary 
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Joseph Califano stated 
that his agency, which controlled NIH, did not intend to invoke 
existing statutory authority to regulate DNA activities, preferring 
to continue with voluntary control of industry based on NIH's guide-
lines. 99 Over the next five years RAC steadily relaxed the NIH 
guidelines by determining that ever more classes of experiments 
posed no special hazard. 100 
C. The Coordinated Framework 
In the Spring of 1984 the Council on Natural Resources and the 
Environment formed a Working Group on Biotechnology.10! The 
Working Group prepared and published the Coordinated Framework 
as a proposal for the regulation of biotechnology by existing agencies, 
under existing statues. 102 
On October 31, 1985, the Domestic Policy Council formed the 
Biotechnical Science Coordinating Committee (BSCC),103 to establish 
for all regulatory agencies common definitions of "intergeneric or-
ganism" and "pathogen," and to limit federal regulation to these 
entities. 104 
The BSCC ruled that an intergeneric organism is a microorganism 
that is "deliberately formed to contain an intergeneric combination 
of genetic material. "105 Basing a regulatory definition on the location 
of microbes in the taxonomic system, however, is questionable be-
cause of the lack of scientific agreement on the taxonomic classifi-
cations and the categories' relation to each other. 106 
Likewise, a pathogen is a "virus or microorganism . . . [broadly 
defined] that has the ability to cause disease in other living organ-
isms."107 This is followed by a long gloss stating, in effect, that an 
98 See Roger Lewin, Recombinant DNA as a Political Pawn, 79 NEW SCIENTIST 672, 672 
(1978). 
99 [d. at 673. 
100 [d. at 674. 
101 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (1984). 
102 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (1985) (proposed Dec. 31, 1984). 
103 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174 (1985); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (1986). 
104 The Coordinated Framework's definitions are intended to determine what organisms 
should be appropriate for certain types of review. 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (1986). 
105 [d. 
106 See, "Principles for Federal Oversight of Biotechnology: Planned Introduction into the 
Environment of Organisms with Modified Hereditary Traits," 55 Fed. Reg. 31118, (1990) 
[hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Refinement"] " ... Taxonomy ... is imprecise for 
microorganisms." [d. at 31119. 
107 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986). 
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organism is a regulated pathogen when the organism is dangerous. 108 
Up until July 31, 1990 the Coordinated Framework used these two 
definitions to describe reviewable genetically modified organisms. 109 
Mter an eighteen month comment period, the Working Group 
published the final Coordinated Framework on June 26, 1986. 110 The 
Coordinated Framework expressed the Executive Branch's opinion 
that the existing statutes provide a basic network of agency control 
over biotechnology's research and products sufficient for the regu-
lation of the plants, animals, and microorganisms created by the new 
genetic engineering techniques. III The Coordinated Framework pro-
vides a chart which summarizes agency jurisdiction and authority 
over the approval of biotechnology products. 112 
Regulatory authority under the Framework, however, extends 
only to risks from the use or misuse of biotechnology products which 
are regulated already in the stream of commerce. 113 As an example 
of the Framework's maintenance of the status quo, the Department 
of Labor declared that its regulations under the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act were adequate and that the new biology did not 
require new regulations to protect workers. 114 Thus the Occupational 
Safety arid Health Act does nothing to narrow the class of unregu-
lated organisms or to regulate releases not covered by the Frame-
work. 
The Coordinated Framework does not cover animals which are 
not insects, plants which are not parasites, or insects which are not 
plant pests. 11S Even though the FDA regulates the use of plants and 
animals for food and medicine,116 the FDA and United States De-
partment of Agriculture regulate veterinary medicine,117 and the 
Public Health Service regulates the interstate movement of etiologic 
agents,118 a considerable range of transgenic plants and animals are 
still free of federal regulation. 
108 See, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,306-07 (1986). 
109 See 51 Fed. Reg. 23,307 (1986) (Coordinated Framework). 
110 51 Fed. Reg. 23,301 (1986). 
111 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302-03 (1986) The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP) reaffirmed this opinion when the agency issued its "Principles for Federal Oversight 
of Biotechnology." 55 Fed. Reg. 31,118 (1990). 
liZ Chart 1, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,304 (1986). 
113 51 Fed Reg. 23,304 (1986). 
114 51 Fed. Reg. 23,348 (1986). 
115 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (1990). 
116 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988). 
117 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360B (1988); Virus, Serum, Toxin Act, 
21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1989). 
lI8 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1991). 
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The residual class of life forms which are not regulated under any 
federal program will be referred to in this Article as "unregulated 
organisms." As examples of unregulated organisms, an industrial 
enterprise might engineer transgenic fish for weed and mosquito 
control, or oysters for pearl production and release them to the 
environment without any intent that people would use the organisms 
for food. If the genetic engineering work did not have government 
funding, the organisms' release would be unregulated even if the 
release occurred in the waters of the United States. 119 
Furthermore, the Coordinated Framework does not apply to a 
large amount of biotechnology work because research does not have 
a product. 12o Most genetically modified organisms that scientists re-
lease to the environment are experiments, not commercial products, 
therefore the Framework does not apply to the resulting organisms 
unless experimenters receive government funding,121 or come under 
the experimental use permit section of the laws. 122 For experiments 
involving unregulated organisms and carried on without government 
funding, reporting and peer review are only voluntary. 123 While some 
such research on future commercial products might fall under the 
experiment provisions of, for example, Toxic Substance Control Act 
(TSCA)124 and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA),125 one can imagine uses which might escape even these 
definitions. 
D. The Proposed Refinement of the Coordinated Framework 
In hopes of clarifying the Framework, the President's Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy (OSTP), the parent body of the BSCC, 
referred the problem of what organisms the Coordinated Framework 
119 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (1990). No reported case or lawsuit has suggested that such a 
release might be covered by § 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1344), § 10 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. § 403). 
120 That is, while some research may lead to a product, pure scientific research, especially 
as practiced in universities, does not by itself create a product per se. 
121 51 Fed. Reg. 23,305 (1986). 
122 See, e.g., FIFRA § 5, (7 U.S.C. § 136c (1980»; TSCA § 5(h)(3), (15 U.S.C. § 2604(h) 
(1982». 
123 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
124 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h). See generally, W. Schiffbauer, Regulating Genetically Engi-
neered Microbial Products Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 ELR 10279 (1985); 
Louis Sorell, Note, Biotechnology Regulation Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 57 (1985). 
125 See 7 U.S.C. § 136c (1980); Michael Vandenbergh, Note, The Rutabaga That Ate Pitts-
burgh: Federal Regulation of Free Release Biotechnology, 72 VA. L. REV. 1529 (1986). 
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covered to the White House Council on Competitiveness. 126 In late 
July 1990, on the basis of the Council on Competitiveness's recom-
mendation, OSTP proposed a refinement of the Coordinated Frame-
work for regulation of biotechnology.127 As the refinement itself de-
clares, the "Coordinated Framework was expected to evolve in 
accordance with the experience of the industry, and, thus, modifi-
cations to the framework were anticipated. "128 This modification, 
however, goes to the heart of the Coordinated Framework-the 
definition of organism and the need for government supervision of 
releases to the environment of genetically modified organisms. 
The Coordinated Framework limited its application to two classes 
of organisms-organisms formed by the combination of genetic ma-
terial from sources in different genera and microorganisms contain-
ing genetic material from pathogenic species-with each class having 
several exceptions. 129 The proposed 1990 refinement declares that 
the Coordinated Framework now applies to all "organisms with 
deliberately modified hereditary traits. "130 Because regulation under 
the refinement requires deliberate modification, regulation is limited 
to the products of genetic engineering and does not include the 
products of selective breeding and intentional mutation. 131 
For years scientists and representatives of industry have main-
tained that the regulation of biotechnology products should be no 
different from the regulation of hybrids because the risks from ge-
netically modified organisms are comparable to the risks from or-
ganisms modified by conventional breeding techniques and possibly 
less risky because the genetic changes are so specific. 132 Now, the 
refined Coordinated Framework reflects this view, and all such or-
ganisms will be brought within its purview.133 The refined Frame-
work discloses the principle that planned introductions "should not 
be subject to oversight ... unless information concerning the risk 
posed by the introduction indicates that oversight is necessary. "134 
The refinement thus has something for everyone-a broader defini-
126 See 55 Fed. Reg. 3118 (1990). 
127Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text. 
130 55 Fed. Reg. 31120 (1990). 
131 See id. Because the Framework is based on risk rather than on strict classifications, only 
those organism introductions for which safety data already exist, or for which there are 
existing, adequate safety regulations will be excluded from oversight. See id. 
132 See, e.g., FIELD TESTING GMOs, supra note 40, at 64. 
133 See 55 Fed. Reg. 31120 (1990). 
134 See id. 
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tion of genetically modified organisms and a vaguely worded prohib-
ition on their regulation. 
The refinement's definitions feature a no-oversight-until-risk-is-
known approach, implying that the burden is on the regulator to 
demonstrate the risk and bear the cost of showing the risk's exis-
tence. 135 The problem is that regulation turns on the existence of 
"information concerning the risk posed," information which in most 
cases today does not exist yet. 136 
E. State Regulation 
Six states have their own biotechnology regulatory statutes. 137 
The North Carolina statute requires a permit for any release into 
the environment of any, broadly defined, genetically modified organ-
ism. 138 The Oklahoma statute is similar to the North Carolina statute 
except that releases approved under federal law are exempt from 
regulation under Oklahoma law. 139 The Illinois and Wisconsin stat-
utes provide for state commissions to intervene in the federal review 
of releases in their respective states, and to protect the states' 
interests in the federal review process. 140 
1. The North Carolina Statute 
The North Carolina statute is the only law in the United States, 
including the Coordinated Framework, that provides for compre-
hensive regulation of genetic engineering. For this reason it war-
rants a more complete description than the other state regulatory 
schemes. 
The North Carolina permit process is the only state biotechnology 
statute totally separate from the complexities and ambiguities of the 
federal process; not relying on federal law even for definitions. 141 
The North Carolina statute applies to living organisms changed by 
"the introduction of new genetic material or the regrouping of [their] 
135 See id. 
136 See generally Tiedje, supra note 37. 
137 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 112, §§ 7601-7611 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 231-236 (West 1989, Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116C.91-96 (West 
Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-765-780 (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 2011-
2018 (West Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.60 (West Supp. 1992). 
138 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-772 (Supp. 1991). 
139 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 2016 (West Supp. 1992). 
140 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111112, § 7602 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.60 
(West Supp. 1992). 
141 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-768 (Supp. 1991). 
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genes," except for organisms changed by traditional methods of 
selective breeding. 142 
The statute requires a permit for any "release," defined simply as 
the placement of genetically modified organisms outside of a con-
taining enclosure. 143 Although the statute allows the Genetic Engi-
neering Review Board to request any information necessary in the 
permit application, the statute encourages the board to use appli-
cable federal application information. 144 Fifteen days after the state's 
receipt of the application, the statute requires local notification and 
a public hearing in the county of the proposed release when there is 
"significant public interest. "145 The statute also provides for written 
notice to interested parties who request information concerning the 
release. 146 
One of the North Carolina statute's most interesting provisions 
concerns the handling of confidential business information. 147 While 
permitting an applicant to designate parts of its application as con-
fidential, the statute provides that any person may petition to see 
the information as long as the petition contains an affidavit from the 
petitioner stating that the petitioner does not have any commercial 
interest in the confidential information. l48 This petition triggers a 
required negotiating process between the petitioner and the appli-
cant.149 If the parties cannot reach an agreement on what information 
the petitioner will receive from the applicant, either party may 
appeal to the Board. l50 The Board can deny or grant the petition, 
and give the applicant the choice either to provide the information 
or withdraw its application. 151 The statute also provides that the the 
disclosure or use of confidential business information for the benefit 
of any person other than the applicant is punishable by the same 
daily penalties as those the statute established for any other violation 
of the act.152 This section does not apply to publicizing any infor-
mation about adverse effects from a proposed release because the 
applicant knows in advance that it is accountable for such effects. 153 
142 [d. § 106-768(6)-(8). 
143 [d. § 106-772(A); § 106-768(9). 
144 [d. § 106-772(b). 
145 [d. § 106-773(a-b). 
146 [d. § 106-773(a). 
147 [d. § 106-774. 
148 [d. 
149 [d. § 106-774(B). 
150 [d. 
151 [d. 
152 [d. § 106-774(C); § 106-776(C) (fine not less than $250 nor more than $1,000 for each 
offense with each day's violation constituting a separate offense). 
153 [d. § 106-774(D). 
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The statute was the outcome of an eighteen-month study of the 
regulation of biotechnology in North Carolina by a committee made 
up of manufacturers, users, universities, state government, and the 
environmental community.l54 During the process it appeared that 
the interests represented were not as divergent as most had at first 
expected, and the final law had the support of all factions. 155 This 
observation holds promise for the success of a more serious federal 
process to develop a national biotechnology law. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
This article proposes another approach to the control of genetic 
engineering. In brief, the proposal is for a system which requires a 
routine permit for all releases to the environment of genetically 
modified organisms, deliberately modified organisms, and non-native 
organisms. All permit applications must be signed by a licensed 
professional scientist who accepts personal responsibility for the 
oversight of the release. 
A. Replace the Coordinated Framework 
The proposed system would replace the Coordinated Framework, 
although the present regulatory agencies would still regulate bio-
technology products that fall under their jurisdiction. That is, pes-
ticides would still have to comply with FIFRA,156 food and medicine 
with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,157 and plant pests with 
Federal Plant and Pests Act. 158 . 
In order to gain the advantages of prompt responsive local pro-
cessing of applications, the new regulatory system would require 
applicants to file their initial application in the state where the 
release was to take place. 159 To encourage further local response, 
the system would include provision for prompt public notice of the 
release proposal in the county of release. 160 States could further 
delegate the process to a more local level if they chose. 
The initial review would quickly determine, on the basis of mini-
mum criteria set forth in the law, whether the proposed release was 
164 Telephone Interview with Willard Dickerson, North Carolina Department of Agriculture 
(Jan. 3, 1990). 
165 [d. 
166 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y. 
157 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393. 
166 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj. 
159 See supra notes 154--57 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra notes 156--57 and accompanying text. 
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routine-needing only local technical review and approval-or 
whether the release was novel-requiring review and possibly a 
hearing at a higher level. The criteria for routine treatment would 
evolve through time with increased knowledge of genetic engineer-
ing and the interaction of releases with the local ecology. For ex-
ample, the planting of genetically modified corn where no potentially 
interbreeding relatives of the corn grow wild would require only 
routine treatment. A federal agency would determine whether there 
were public policy implications for projects such as increasing her-
bicide tolerance in crops or the release of deliberately modified or-
ganisms in National Parks or Wilderness Areas. After identifying 
any such implications, the agency would instruct the state hearing 
panels on factors to be considered in deciding whether or not to 
permit a specific release. 161 
The law also would provide for regional or state administrative 
hearings for review of the "novel" releases. This hearing would 
review both the technical considerations of the proposed release as 
well as the economic, social, and aesthetic considerations within 
limits set out in the law. 162 The technical safety portion of the 
review of "novel" releases would be a detailed look at both the 
proposed organism and the ecological system into which the release 
was proposed. The review would require special studies to support 
the application. The permit would most likely have conditions at-
tached to it when permission was granted. As in North Carolina, a 
public hearing would be an optional part of the review process. 163 
At the present time, in biotechnology regulation, issues of safety 
and policy are totally entangled, resulting in regulatory gridlock. l64 
This stagnation does not exist in building construction because the 
social questions raised by projects are decided in a political process 
which reviews the use proposed for the property. Only when the 
political process approves the proposed use does technical review of 
161 For example, the state review would include economic, social, and aesthetic considera-
tions but would not focus on the technical details of the release. 
162 Congress should legislate in terms of general statements of objectives and procedures, 
with clear statement of the social values to be promoted. Then it should delegate the political 
decisions to the agencies' discretion, laying out only the circumstances when the discretion is 
to be exercised. This delegation would address the problems that arise when Congress becomes 
obsessed with the details of environmental legislation, the more elusive and erratic consensus 
becomes. Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks through 
Law, 30 JURIMETRICS, J. OF LAW, Sc. AND TECH., 271 (Spring 1990); see infra notes 283-86 
and accompanying text. 
163 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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the structure for compliance take place. The same process would be 
effective for review of releases to the environment. 
B. Professional Supervision of Releases 
This paper proposes that the federal law enacting the new system 
contain the following requirement: 
Every release to the environment of organisms with deliberately 
modified hereditary traits must be supervised by a licensed 
professional who has personal responsibility that the release is 
conducted in accordance with good scientific practices. 
The seven major elements of this proposal are considered in the 
following sections. 
1. Every Release 
This provision is different from the refinement,165 in that this 
system requires professional supervision of every release, while the 
refinement limits governmental supervision to releases of demonstr-
able risk. 166 In addition, this proposal is not for governmental over-
sight, but rather oversight by individuals with ethical obligations, 
who are trained to look outside the normal bounds of their specialized 
fields. 
This requirement applies to every release because although most 
releases will not have any dangerous implications for society or the 
environment, some releases will be dangerous. There is no way to 
tell which releases are dangerous without the consideration of some-
one trained to spot the few releases needing special review. 
2. To the Environment 
By this clause the statute is applicable only to releases to the 
environment. There is no requirement that a licensed professional 
supervise every bakery, brewery, or pharmaceutical factory using 
genetically modified organisms. This clause, however, in no way 
relieves responsible individuals from liability for accidental releases 
of genetically modified organisms which escape from the premises of 
such facilities. 
The reason for regulating is that once genetically modified organ-
isms are in the environment, they may be impossible to eradicate. 
165 See 55 Fed. Reg. 31,118 (1990), see supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
166 55 Fed. Reg. 31,118 (1990). 
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Despite the present concern with the extinction of species, it is very 
difficult to exterminate a specific species without doing serious col-
lateral damage to the environment in which the species lives. 167 
3. Organism with Deliberately Modified Hereditary Traits 
This provision is the same as the language proposed in the refine-
ment. 168 Any organism is a deliberately modified organism when 
human intervention has altered any of the organism's hereditary 
traits. 169 Unlike the refinement, however, the proposed law would 
not include any exceptions to the professional supervision of releases 
to the environment because the problem is not only from the organ-
ism's inherent danger but also from its interaction with a specific 
ecological context. 170 
4. Supervised 
This law proposes supervision similar to the supervision an archi-
tect exercises in·designing a large building. Although an architect is 
not an expert in all the special disciplines required for the design 
and construction of safe structures, architects must know enough 
about buildings in general to coordinate their specialtists' work to 
achieve the product the owner desires while satisfying the architect's 
professional duty to the general public's safety. 171 
Similarly, in biotechnology, this professional supervision would 
allow the coordination under one person's responsibility of the varied 
sciences which bear on releases to the environment. These varied 
sciences include the released organism's biology and molecular biol-
ogy, as well as the release site's ecology. In addition, a professional 
scientist's expertise would include the knowledge of what other sci-
ences are needed. This coordination of scientific specialties is nec-
essary to manage the tremendous diversity and problems deliber-
ately modified organism releases raise. 
Because even a small release of a genetically modified organism 
can cause as much trouble as the gypsy moths have caused, profes-
167 See generally, discussion supra parts II.B. 
168 See 55 Fed. Reg. 31,120 (1990). 
169 See id. 
170 See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text. 
171 See American Institute of Architects Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct. 
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sional supervision would be required even for small releases. 172 This 
requirement applies to both academic and industrial research. Such 
supervision will not likely be a problem for industry because it 
already is accustomed to environmental regulation and reporting.173 
This mandatory supervision will be more of a change for academic 
researchers who are not used to any accountability beyond the peer 
review of the local biohazards safety committee, or RAC.174 But to 
be fair, and to enhance public confidence, the rules must be the same 
for both kinds of research. 
5. Licensed Professional 
Certainly the release to the environment of genetically modified 
organisms requires competent professional judgment. Lawyers, for 
example, require a license to practice their profession, and all such 
practitioners must accept personal liability for their failure to live 
up to their profession's standards of competence. 175 Because the 
release of genetically modified organisms to the environment may 
have an even larger adverse impact than the actions of other profes-
sionals, assigning similar responsibility to an individual in charge of 
a release is a natural step. 
The proposal is that a licensed professional scientist supervise and 
be personally responsible that the release is carried out in an ethical 
manner in accordance with the law. This does not mean that the 
professional scientist routinely would be personally liable for the 
unforesee~ble consequences of a release. The professional scientist 
would be responsible only for conducting the release in a careful 
manner. 
The new law could create a national license requirement. Profes-
sional designation would require knowledge of molecular biology and 
ecology, as well as the laws of genetic engineering. The key require-
ment is that the person supervising any release should have a suf-
ficiently broad, general knowledge of the relevant sciences and law 
172 Under the NIH Guidelines, as summarized in the Coordinated Framework at 55 Fed. 
Reg. 23,349 (1990), only four classes of experiments are brought to the RAC, including "Class 
III-A-2 deliberate releases to the envITonment of any organism containing recombinant DNA." 
All others require only approval of thfl local Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), (Class 
III-B), notice to the IBC (Class III-C) or the experiments are exempt (Class III-D) from the 
guidelines. Id. 
173 Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. 
ON REG. 89, 93 (1988). 
174 [d. 
175 See, e.g., American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon I. 
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to prevent mistakes arising from a failure to perceive risks outside 
an individual's specialty.176 
The cooperation of licensed professionals who have explicit obli-
gations larger than their own interests is an important pillar in the 
structure of environmental law. The key to this regulatory system 
is personal professional accountability. Although there is no prece-
dent for the legislative creation of licensed specialty practitioners, 
there are ample technically qualified candidates and adequate com-
mercial incentives so that the creation of such a licensing law would 
not cause genetic engineering to cease. 
6. Personal Responsibility 
Personal responsibility means that professional scientists are per-
sonally liable if their review and planning of the release falls below 
the standard of care exercised by other professional genetic engi-
neers in the community. This does not mean, however, that the 
professional engineer is responsible for damage done by a runaway 
deliberately modified organism if that damage was professionally 
unforeseeable. 
Personal responsibility is important so that the general public 
knows there is an individual responsible for what happens, and ready 
to accept the consequences if anything goes wrong.177 This respon-
sibility helps allay the fear that specialists who lack concern for the 
wider implications of their work are releasing deliberately modified 
organisms. 
7. Good Scientific Practices 
Because the possibilities from harm from releasing deliberately 
modified organisms to the environment are very broad, the science 
itself has to be equally broad. The genetic engineer will receive 
training to think about the organism's movement by its own power, 
176 An example of how licensed professional status would be helpful in controlling risk from 
the release to the environment of genetically modified organisms is found as an incidental 
matter in the Federal District Court opinion in Found. on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 680 F. 
Supp. 10 (D.C. 1988). There the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
allowed the USDA to use safety data on open air releases, even though the data had been 
obtained from an experiment that had not complied with USDA requirements for prior notice. 
See id. at 16. The court observed in a footnote that although the breach was serious it was 
simply not the issue under review in the case so it was disregarded. [d. at n.5. Had the 
researcher been a licensed professional, professional discipline would have been available to 
investigate and punish such a lapse. 
177 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
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run-off, wind, or transport on some host or vector. The genetic 
engineer also will consider the possibility of the deliberately modified 
inheritable trait transferring genetically to other organisms in the 
vicinity, thereby allowing modified traits to escape despite physical 
control over the modified organism. The genetic engineer will also 
receive training to look for novel interactions-ecological trouble in 
the target environment from an organism which has not caused a 
problem in a different environment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Genetic engineering is only the latest manifestation of technical 
progress with Promethean potential for harm or good. It is not the 
last. Beyond the debate over the details of regulation, it is time for 
legislative control to evolve from seeking to prevent harm from each 
new technology to preventing harm from new technology in general. 
One useful tool in the construction of such a meta-system would be 
the early imposition of professional standards on new technologies 
as they arise, rather than waiting for guilds of practitioners to seek 
such status for their own benefit. 
